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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
-

VS

-

DAVID KAAE, DEITH WAYNE EWER,

&

MICHAEL

HORN[

Defendants-Appeallants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This ts an appeal from a conviction fur
violation of Section
and

3

76-9-3

Utah Code Annotated

and Section

76-38·1

(1953).

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellants were trJed in the District
Court in and for Cache County, the Honorable
VeNoy Chris toffersen presiding, and found guilti
of Second Degree Burglary and Grand Larceny.

t
1

It

- 2 -

!:

i

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appeallants prays that the judgment of the

.!

tower Court be reversed and the case remanded for
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 31st day of August, 1971, Keith Plowman
awoke to find that during the night or early morning
hours, person or persons unknown had entered his
store, Kieth's Market through the front door and
there was missing therefrom merchandise of a value
in excess of $50.00.

t

l

JI.

,:!!

.I

,i

Subsequently, on the 3rd of

September, 1971, two officers of the Logan City
Police Department, Leon Wursten and Richard
Wright, acting on an informants tip came to the

I
.!

apartment rented by one David Kaae located at 970
North 7th East, Logan, Utah.

The Officers entered

the apartment and located merchandise later identified
as part of that that had been taken from Kieth's
Harket.

'

The manner by which entry was gained and

the merchandise found is much in doubt and the
evidence Is hopelessly conflicting but ls clear that

- 3 no warrant was issued authorizing the searchar·.
seizure.

The defendants were arrested and take·

to the Logan City Pol ice Department and signeo
confessions implicating themselves, each other,
others not. joining in this appea I .

1

The evidenci

of the s iezed merchandise and of the subsequent
confessions was adduced at preliminary hearing;·
after arra rgnment defendants brought a motion to
surpress the admission of the siezed merchandise'
and of the confessions as evidence.

Th is motion

was denied and the defendants were subsequently
tried on a stipulated set of facts as
the pre I iminary hearing and at
mot Jon to surpress.

hearing on the

Based on those facts, a

judgment of gui I ty was rendered by the Court,
defendants excepting from the admission of the
evidence they had sought to have surpressed.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADM I TT I NG EV I DENCE THAT
WAS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH IN THAT THE

-

- 4-

SEARCH WAS MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT AND THE SEARCH
010 NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE P.ECOGNIZED
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
While It is clear that in certain instances
a search without a warrant is a legal and justified
act, it becomes incumbent on the State to bring
themselves within the exception relied on.
As stated in WOLF v. COLORADO, 338 U.S. 25,27-28;

93 LED 1782 (1948).
The security of ones privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the Police - - which Is the core of the Fourth Ammendment
Is basic to a free society. It is therefore
Implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty"
and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause. The
knock at the door, whether by day or by
night, as a prelude to a search, without
authority of the law but soley on the
authority of the police, did not need the
commentary of recent history to be condemned
One of the more recent pronouncements in this
area by the Supreme Court of the United States is
found in COOLIDGE vs NEW HAMPSHIRE, 29 L ED. 2d

564

U.S. 443 (1971).

In which Justice Ste\-1art

held:
Thus the most basic constitutional rule
• f

- 5 in this area is that "searchs conducted
outside the judicial process, without
prior approval
judge or magistrate
I
are per se unrea ::ionab I e under the Fourth
Ammendment- - - subject only to a few
specifical ly establ ished and wel 1-delineat•
exceptions . 11 5
·
11
The excgp ti ons a re j ea I ous I y and care'ull.
drawn," and there must be a "showing b
those who seek exemption - - - that
exigencies
the situation made that co,:
Imperative."
"The burden is OI'\ those
the exemption to show the need fc.r- it. 11

07

This statement is probably the mose
of the law pertaining to warrant!:

cogent

aM cites the cases of

!'ft TL.._y.

UNITED

STATES_, 389 U.5.347; 357 19 L ED 2d 576,83 S Ct.
v. UNITED STATES, 335, U.S.

507

!51J

93 l ED U.S. 153 (1968)· UNITED STATES

'/_ Jf=FERS, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 96 L. fD 59, 72
S. Ct.

93 (1951)

In the instant case, the

;eeks to

bring itself within the exceptions, to the warran
requirement.

It was contended Dy

States

throughout the proceedings that f'·i r ; t, the offic
were there by i nvi tat ion or pe.-rl'l ss ion and that
0

therefore the evidence obtained

,.JJ'.:>

a result of

- 6 a consensual search, and as a corollary to that
proposition, that the evidence was in "pt a in
view" and as such, there was actually no search
or that at least no warrant was required.
If the evidence is taken in the light
most favorable to the state, which it shouldn't
be as is made clear above, Logan City Police
officers knocked on the door and were admitted
by appellant Kieth Wayne Ewer and there came upon
suspected contraband from a recent burglary.

It

Is also clear that the police went to the residence
to Investigate that same burglary relying on a
tip from an unidentified informant {pages 4,8,20,38).
It seems that what we have here is a planned
warrantless search {p. 32,38) as is disapproved in
COOLIDGE v NEW HAMPSHIRE, Supa., at footnote 27
and citing TRUPIANO v. UNITED STATES, 334 U.S.
;:,,

1699) 92 L Ed !663 (1948) at pages 707-708 .
....,.

As Is made clear in the cases cited above,
the state must support its position with evidence
of the strongest character.

It seems to beg the

- 7question to say that the officers testimony aq
permission was clear and convincing particularli

le

tn I i9ht of the admitted knowledge of the officer

ti

as to the probable involvment of the petitioners

A

t 'n t he er i me. The court be 1ow appears to have tal:
position that the appellants must assert their
right to be free from warrantless search in a
and convincing manner (p. 172 & 173).

The Court

further took the position that the officer must
demand to search the place in order to gain some!:
of an unwi 11 i ng acquiescence to his presence. (i,f
ne I ther of the above propositions of the Court fai·
·state the law as to consent to search.

As polnteo

out In JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 333 U.S. 10, P.Jl

92 L. ed 486 (1948) in holding that certain eviden:
by surpressed, lt is enough that entry·was gained
bpder color of the office and that l t was granted

In submission to authority rather than through

an

understanding and intentional Waiver of a constitu·
tlonal right.

In the JOHNSON vs UNITED STATELli!t

·
the facts were that the o ff 1cers
suspec t I ng that

I

- 8 appellant was smoking opium in violation of Federal
Jaw.

The officers knocked and a voice asked who was

there to which the reply was "Lieutenant Belland".
·'

After some delay the defendant

door and

the officer said, "I want to talk to you a little bit".
at thts point the appellant

11

stepped back acquiesently

and admitted us'." the Officer then said,

11

1 want

to talk to you about this opium smell in the room
here." After a denial by the appellant she was placed
under arrest and the room was searched, turning up
incriminating evidence.

The Johnson case seems to

fairly support appellants position here.

As stated

by the Court below this was not the case of exigent
circumstances but one of consent.

The testimony of

the officers who entered the apartment construed together with the testimony of the occupants point to
a situation of acquiesence to authority.

Certainly

no one stepped forward with any knowing and under""'"'. -

Standing waiver of the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure as
required by the cases cited above.

The evidence

- 9 Indicated that there were various inquiries by the
occupants of the room as to the officers right
there, that the re we re demands that the officers
produce a warrant and a general passive confussion
which seems obviously to be an acquiescence and/or
submission to the authority presented by the office;
The major problem presented by this case is
answered question as to why the office rs did not

wai:

for someone that they knew had the authority and
their purpose in being there manifest before enterir;
the home.
POINT 2
ASSUM I NG THAT THE SEARCH AND ARREST WERE ILLEGAL,
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADM I TT I NG INTO EV I DENCE,
APPELLANTS CONFESSIONS.
The general rule as to the admisability of
obtained after an i I legal search is stated
SUN v UNITED STATES 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407,_!

Ed. 2nd 441, (1963)

The exclusionary rule has traditionally barr;o
from trial physical, tangible materials obtaini 1
either during or as a direct result of unlaW-1
fu1 Invasion. It fol tows from our holding t
In SILVERMAN v UNITED STATES, 365 U,S.

505 Sl j

_.....

- 10 -

S. CT. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2nd 734 (1961), that the
Fourth Amendment may protect against the
overhearing of verbal statements as
as
against the more traditional seizure of
"papers and effects. 11 Si mi 1ar1 y, testimony
as to matters observed during an unlawful
Invasion has been excluded in order to enforce
the basic constitutional policies . . . thus,
verbal evidence which derives so immediately
from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized
arrest as to the officers action in the
present case is no 1es s the "fru i t" of off i c i a 1
Illegality than the more common tangible fruits
of the unwarranted invasion. 9 L Ed. 2nd. at 545.
I

The Court also said, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 454, that
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule
Invite (no) logical distinction between
and verbal evidence. Either in
terms of deferring lawless conduct by federal
off lcers . • . or of closing the doors of
the federal courts to any use of evidence
unconstitutionally obtained . • . the danger
In relaxing the exclusionary rule in the case
of verbal evidence would seem too great to
warrant introducing such a distinction.
However, the Court then said later that:
we need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit
of the poisonous tree simply because it would
not have come to 1 i gh t for the i 11ega1 actions
of the police.
the more apt question
In such a case is whether, grating establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come
at by the exploitation of that illegality of
Instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of that primary taint.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah seems

-

- 11 -

to emp 1oy tta "Causation-Vo 1un tar i nes s app roach11
interpreting the language above.
RIOJAS, 14

See STATE vs.

Znd 7S, 377 P. 2d 640 (1963). 6ther

States who ai:Dpted what has been cal led the deterr,:
approach, in wni ch the t anguage in WONG SUN poi ntin;
to the need :ti deter such 1aw1 es s conduct on the
part of theiffic;ers is adopted.

Bas i ca 11 y there

i1

I

no differenCE in the two approaches as they still
rely on the:tandard cf voluntadness in determinin;'
whether

of a confession is admissable,

)

It would seemhowe11er., that the Court must adopt
some objecti>.e standard in order that the law offici:

may guide trair conduct accordingly in situations
such as the iinstant one.

For that reason the

appellants Cintend that the rule proposed by the
American Law Institute in the Proposed Hodel Codeol
Pre-arraignrnmt Procedure (tentative draft numberlli
be adopted. This rule., while removing the officers
conduct from a subjective standard does not impose u:;

off I cers. and

facto surpress ion regardless of
of the confession.

This rule is set

- 12 -

forth in the A.L.I.

902:

If a law enforcement officer, acting without
a warrant, arrests a person without reasonable
cause ••• and the Court determines that
>uch arrest was made without a fa
for the belief that such cause exlsted, no
statement made by such person after such arrest
end prior to his release, unless it is made
in the presence of or upon concultation with
counsel, shall be admitted in evidence
against such a person in a criminal proceeding
in which he is the defendant.
The notes to this Section, A.L.I. Code, P. 65,
state that the rule is to halt "investigative arrests:
the rule, as proposed, states that if the
arrests ''without a warrant" the rule is to be L-. •oked.
However, in the instant case we have the office;s
entering the promises without a warrant and based
on fnformation gained from a nameless informant,
of unknown creditability, under circumstances that
the Court has been asked to rule on in Point 1.
Under the formula as prescribed by the A.L.I.
code

i

902, the Court.must

tioon a finding

of no probable cause and of no
rule that the confessions are inadrnissabte.
If the Court applies the "Causation-Voluntarines·s"

- 13 rule It ts contended by the appellants that the,
State may st i 11 not ava i 1 i tse 1f of the confessio:
From an examination of the transcript ( page

1

et1

It can be seen that a confession was obtained
the Defendant Kaae the same evening as the seard
was made.

The Defendants were taken directly fro·1

the apartment that was searched to the po 1ice sta:(
and detained there unt i 1 such time as a confessio·
was given.

There is a good deal of testimony as 1

to whether inducements were made in the form of 1
allowing the accused to go home or
In the jail, depending on whether or

'

confo1I

was given, and whether the officers stated that ii
would "go easier on them" if a confessionwasgiv1
but even under

causation" apprt11

the confession of Defendant Kaae must fal 1. As ti
the confessions of Ewer and Horne it can only
that Ewer and Horne did not present themselves
make voluntary confessions but rather that
brought into the police station at a later datei;:
confronted with either the other confessions oroi
representations that other confessions

'

- 14 them had been obtained.

It is urged by the appellants

that this a coersive factor which is a direct result
of the illegal search and the tainted confession
obtained incident thereto.

It seems that there were

special coercive circumstances surrounding the
confession of each of the Defendants.

In the case

of the qppellant Ewer, he had been subjected to the
ordeal of the search and the knowledge of confessions
obtained incident thereto.

As to Horne, he was

taken from his home on Sunday n-i gh t to the po 1ice
'

station and held until a confession was signed.

"'

summarizing the position of the Courts that endorse

)

In

the "Causation-Voluntariness" test, Our federal
circuit Court iniHOLLINGSWORTH vs UNITED STATES 321
F. 2d. 342 (16th Cir. 1963) the Court said at page

350:
The fact that a confession was obtained from
during his custody under an unlawful
arrest does not ipso facto make it involuntary and inadmissible, but the fact
that a confession was obtained during
such custody and the attendant circumstances
should be considered in determining whether
the confession was voluntary, but voluntariness still remains the test of admissability.

- 15 -

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellant did not receive a
·fair trial consistent with his rights in that
the Court admitted evidence which was a fruit of
an 11lega1 search and s i ezure and confessions which
were the fruit of an i 1JegaJ search and surrounding
course of circumstances.

Appellant therefore

urges that he be granted a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney at Law
52 North 1st East
Logan, Utah 84321

